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Transcription (revised by AP and PLG) 
Harvard Science Center 
06 February 2012 
 
A Strange Reconciliation: A Conversation about Architecture and Science with 
Peter Galison and Antoine Picon 
By David Theodore 
 
Peter Galison is Joseph Pellegrino University Professor  and Director, Collection of 
Historical Scientific Instruments, at Harvard University. 
 
Antoine Picon is the G. Ware Travelstead Professor of the History of Architecture and 
Technology and Co-Director of Doctoral Programs at the Harvard University Graduate 
School of Design. 
 
David Theodore is a PhD candidate in the History of Architecture, Medicine, and 
Science at Harvard University. 
 
 
PG Design has a double anxiety surrounding it in the current moment. One part concerns 
design and art. Is design art? You can see that anxiety, for instance, in the tensions and 
the explosive interest in design at the Museum of Modern Art. Paola Antonelli and others 
have reached a whole new generation of younger people who go to MOMA to see design, 
but who don’t go to see, say, the Picasso show.1 The other concerns design and science. It 
used to be pejorative to call scientific work “design.” Design, physicists thought, was 
something that would go on at engineering school or at Intel, not in the heartland of pure 
science. But now design has this double aspect, on the one side reaching towards 
engineering and science, and on the other reaching toward art. That gives it a special 
liveliness that is perhaps part of the same ethos that motivates this issue of tarp. How are 
we conceiving architecture and science at this moment, and can we get away from the 
older ways of speaking? 
 
AP But how can you design both architecture and molecules? What does design bring to 
the table, solutions or problems? For architects—and this is a bit different from design in 
science—design is a way to let problems emerge. Younger designers are so anxious to 
participate in solving the problems of the world. One has to remind them that problem-
solving is precisely an engineering activity. Today with sustainability we risk a return to 
this very positivist dream of scientific technology. In architecture good design is about 
revealing tangible issues, but not necessarily complete solutions.  
 
PG When I was editing the book The Architecture of Science, I was struck by how many 
people felt the obligation to argue against the idea that architecture was nothing but a 
                                               
1 See e.g. the 2011 exhibition Talk to Me: 
http://www.moma.org/interactives/exhibitions/2011/talktome/ 
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kind of calculus.2 That was surprising. It had never occurred to me that someone would 
think architecture was nothing other than an automatic calculus, like running a program 
to build a curve between two points. But I presume the notion had enough sway back in 
the 50s and 60s so that still in the 1990s people felt obliged to naysay it. 
 
AP There’s also the prestige of science. Architecture as a discipline is always anxious 
about its prestige. That’s one of the few things that has been transmitted with the DNA of 
western architecture. It’s even in Vitruvius. There’s a longing for supremacy and at the 
same time a deep insecurity. Architecture aspires to be as rigorous and noble as science, 
and that provokes the counter-reaction: “No! architecture, will never be science!” 
 
PG Where we might be able to enter this conversation in a useful way is that both 
Antoine and I are interested in materiality, and the way that questions of design, 
engineering, and architecture might be thought about both historically and in the 
contemporary world. We share a theoretical orientation that takes materiality seriously. 
Material culture and the object are important to both of us.3 
 
DT Let me ask the correlationist question. Speculative Realist philosophers want to turn 
from epistemology to ontology. They use SR as a way out of the constructivism of 
postmodern theory by pointing out (and rejecting) instances where questions about the 
existence of objects are turned into questions of how we might know those objects. Ray 
Brassier, one of the organizers of the first SR conference, had this to say about the 
movement: “the only thing that unites us is antipathy to what Quentin Meillassoux calls 
‘correlationism’—the doctrine, especially prevalent among ‘Continental’ philosophers, 
that humans and world cannot be conceived in isolation from one other—a 
‘correlationist’ is any philosopher who insists that the human-world correlate is 
philosophy’s sole legitimate concern.”4 How would you characterize the human-world 
correlate in your own work? 
 
AP I don’t see how in design you can escape the link between human and world. In 
design there is something in your mind, and by the end there is an external object. And 
you have to explain what kind of relations there are between the two. The idea of 
imagination, mental process, representation: this is the important problem.  
 
PG I think a lot about design in the sciences. The history of the field I work most in, 
particle physics, is about how to use evidence to show the existence of something. How 
does a bubble chamber picture, or spark chamber data, or counts in images, how do they 
aggregate to form evidence that then can be used as a representation of a world that 
already exists? In that sense, the question really is fundamentally epistemological, about 
how do we get and secure knowledge. 
                                               
2 Peter Galison and Emily Thompson, eds., The Architecture of Science (Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 1999). 
3 See e.g. essays by Galison and Picon in Things that Talk: Object Lessons from Art and 
Science, ed. Lorraine Daston (New York: Zone Books, 2004). 
4 Ray Brassier interviewed by Bram Ieven in 2009 for nY 2; see http://ny-
web.be/transitzone/against-aesthetics-noise.html 
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But these days, colleagues in physics departments are now also concerned with making 
things. If you want to figure out how to make the smallest conceivable transistor out of a 
couple of atoms, how do you do that? For them the question isn’t so much 
documentation, but production. It’s a design problem. At first this I think rather dramatic 
change met with a lot of resistance in physics departments. People would say, “That’s 
engineering, that’s not physics.” But you don’t hear that anymore. Physicists are trying to 
make objects, to make DNA strands part of computation, or to make on-off circuits that 
can be added up to make the smallest conceivable memory structures, or to make 
nanoscale things in molar quantities not one-off the way physicists have always thought. 
 
These changes have had interesting consequences, one of which is a much less anxious 
relationship to aesthetics, so that you’ll see physicists interested in design. In the 
nineteenth century, physicists were proud of the non-aesthetic quality of their work. 
Aesthetics was seen as pulling in an artistic direction away from verisimilitude. Now the 
journal Physics of Fluids has a prize each year for the image that is both aesthetically 
interesting and scientifically forceful.5 [Peter—is this the journal you meant? Yes, plg ] 
 
AP Perhaps science and design have evolved in opposite directions, which has enabled 
them to meet up. One could say that science has moved from a vision of itself as an 
argument to a vision of itself as a maker. Design–and engineering, too–was always totally 
immersed in making. But in design, aesthetic sensitivity has become less important, 
because argument is the main question. Making is for designers the natural condition, but 
design now asks: what’s the point? what is the argument? what is the why? There is a 
growing obsession with argumentation in design, and a growing obsession with making 
in science. This criss-crossing historical evolution enables hybridization.  
 
DT What about realism? Science still believes in an independently existing world, 
doesn’t it? 
 
PG Independently, but maybe not pre-existing. When John and Washington Roebling 
built the Brooklyn Bridge, they weren’t worried about existence. The designer-builders 
worried about whether the bridge was robust, or whether it would survive under different 
circumstances. Those are engineering questions. What’s changed is a move away from 
representation to presentation. I agree with Antoine that argument is always part of it. 
Scientists are not abandoning argument. But they’re not worried about whether 
something always existed. Some still do of course. Scientists at CERN are asking 
whether the Higgs particle exists. Its existence has consequences for the beginning of the 
universe as well as its current and future functioning. But existence is not the question 
when you’re designing a nanostructure. You’re not worried whether this circuit always 
existed. That would be a ludicrous question. That’s not what they’re interested in. 
 
AP I think you hit upon something really important, which is the crisis of representation. 
Reality is not given through a representation today, it’s given through manipulation. Let’s 
                                               
5 Physics of Fluids maintains an image gallery at 
http://pof.aip.org/gallery_of_fluid_motion 
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take for example the representation of a building. The traditional idea was that even if the 
building did not exist, the image represented something that could exist, and it was of the 
same nature as the representation of an existing building. Today we see an image as 
something that has effectiveness in the material world—it can trigger processes of 
construction, processes of recognizance etc. There still remains for me a question of the 
relation between the image, the building and what we have in the head, what we call 
knowledge in the end. I don’t see how you could go back to any kind of solipsist or 
idealist position negating the fact that external reality exists. The issue is not ultimate 
reality, the issue is ultimately how do we relate to reality. 
 
PG These questions about ontology are just not what scientists engaged in nano-
construction and bio-engineering are focused on. Once you’re in the mode of generating 
philosophical problems that no longer address the concerns of the scientists, then it seems 
to me you’re in precarious philosophical territory. That’s what Wittgenstein was 
constantly warning about, that is, about making intra-philosophical questions that no 
longer answered to our concerns: questions of the type “is my sweater really blue?” Live, 
philosophically-informed questions ought to at least be dealing with matters of concern, 
and those concerns should include those of scientists and engineers. 
 
This connects to the argument of the last sections of the book Objectivity I wrote with 
Lorraine Daston.6 You could say that the problem of representation is one in which you 
have a bi-layer world. You have a world and then you have a representation of that world. 
Realists are people who think the two layers can be attached, that there are arrows that go 
from model to reality. There are many ways of challenging this bi-layer reality. And 
images play a role in that. You can ask, for instance, does this electron microscopic 
image accurately portray what goes on in a neuron? You could say no, there’s a problem 
of artefacts, or interpretation, or that its stains don’t work properly. But if you’re doing 
nano-manipulation, the image isn’t used as pure documentation to say whether something 
existed or it didn’t exist. The image is part of the tools. If you look at the floor plan of a 
nano-lab like the one that’s just behind this building, you’ll see lots of visualization 
modules surrounding a laboratory. And the reason is not because they’re trying to 
document something, to show the accuracy or the correspondence between model and 
reality, it’s because they’re doing something with images. 
 
AP I am really struck these days by how the organicist metaphor has come back in the 
design world. There’s a new organic discourse in the digital around emergence which 
makes me really perplexed.7  
 
DT Do you have a specific example? 
 
AP Take Karl Chu, who tells us that nature is a computation.8 From now on what 
computation does is to emulate nature. I think it goes back to the idea that design is an 
                                               
6 Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, Objectivity (New York: Zone Books, 2007). 
7 Antoine Picon, Digital Culture in Architecture: An Introduction for the Design 
Professions (Basel: Birkhäuser, 2010). 
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extension of nature, an idea you find already in nineteenth-century German architecture, 
with architects such as Karl Friedrich Schinkel, who believed that design was pursuing 
and extending the work of nature. 
 
PG Antoine’s observation is very interesting. In physics there was a moment after WWII 
when simulation became very important. A really interesting contrast developed between 
those who thought that nature was best got at through platonic models and those who 
thought it was best replicated through stochastic simulations. Physicists realized they 
could simulate the processes of what went on in a nuclear reactor or a nuclear bomb, and 
solve problems that were otherwise intractable to them through older analytic techniques. 
This became known as the Monte Carlo method.9 The computer was programmed to use 
real or pseudo-random numbers to allow a process to unfold. The Monte Carlo became 
very popular among physicists to solve all sorts of problems, not just in nuclear matters, 
but also in weather, in fluid dynamics, in all sorts of things. For some scientists this 
random simulation was actually truer to the processes of nature than the analytic 
techniques that had been used for hundreds of years, because, they said, nature was at its 
root random. A stochastic model of a stochastic reality (so this group thought) was 
actually a replication of reality rather than a model of it. If you might call those people 
the “stochasticists,” they were opposed to the Platonists, like Einstein, Dirac, or Maxwell, 
who said that the furniture of the world was written in the language of differential 
equations, of exact curves. This mathematics was what was really true behind things that 
looked random.  
 
AP Today we see a kind of strange reconciliation, a new organicism or vitalism unheard 
of in the past. Vitalism used to be adverse to computation. From the eighteenth century 
on, you had a stable opposition between people interested in mechanics and those 
interested in medicine and vitalism. Today we see the merging of these two traditions. 
Digital designers interested in computation have the idea you can imitate life. For those 
interested in the application of cellular automata to modeling, for instance, this is a 
looming idea. The discourse of emergence, which is so strong among so many designers, 
precisely suspends the question of deterministic versus random or stochastic. They are 
interested in how order unfolds from apparent randomness. 
 
DT Their situation sounds very close to the stochasticists Peter just described. 
 
AP It is both different and related through the reality of computation. For many digital 
designers, the difference between the model and real life gets abolished in important 
ways.  
 
PG To go back to the beginnings, speculation on cellular automata came through the 
work of Stanislaw Ulam and his colleagues, who were also the people creating these 
Monte Carlo methods and simulations. So they are closely related. It also occurs to me 
                                                                                                                                            
8 See for instance Karl Chu, “Metaphysics of Genetic Architecture and Computation,” 
Perspecta 35 (2004): 74-97. 
9  On the Monte Carlo method and artificial reality, see Galison, Image and Logic, 689-
780. 
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that surrounding the art world there’s this fascination with neuro-acts and neuro-
aesthetics. That point of view often takes a computational picture as the root of that 
which is neuronal, and so by extension, a computational picture of aesthetics. Not that 
this notion hasn’t encountered huge resistance; it’s a battle that continues. But there is a 
kind of “pan-computationalism” that we see across many different domains, from art and 
architecture to aesthetics and psychology. 
 
DT Cities seem to be mixed in the ways we’ve been talking about, that is, they are hybrid 
objects that combine the abstract and the physical. Is a city a real thing? 
 
AP A city is not really a thing. Or it’s a very imprecise thing. There is still a problem of 
representation. To call something a city is inseparable from a certain set of 
preconceptions we have. I am interested in thinking about these categories, strangely 
abstract and at the same time concrete, that we mobilize to read technological reality. For 
instance, “infrastructure,” which came not long after “structure” in the mid-eighteenth 
century, was a way to divide the world into a platform structure and then a superstructure. 
It was a very general divide. But “structure” does not exist naturally. How do we 
construct categories like structure or image or map to read the world? 
 
PG We have some classical relations we go around with almost unquestioned about the 
relation of abstraction and the physical. One way is to think that we come up with ideas 
in the most abstract of mathematical physics, and then we form models of it that become 
applied physics, and then it filters down, maybe through the other disciplines, through 
chemistry and biology, or it goes down to more and more applied mechanical or electro-
mechanical things and eventually it will end as something on the factory floor that can be 
made and manufactured and become physical. It’s a descent from the most abstract 
through many intermediate processes to the most concrete. The second way follows the 
opposite direction. It’s the idea that we consider abstraction in a sort of Platonic 
ascension, that we look at machines, and then we abstract simple machines, and then we 
abstract principles, and eventually we get up to some object in Plato’s heaven. 
 
But what happens when the concrete and the abstract really enter together? When 
Einstein or Poincaré look at trains or clocks or telegraphs, but also at philosophy, and the 
abstract principles of what becomes relativity theory?10 I’ve recently been doing work on 
Freud. He was thinking about censorship practices in WWI Vienna through what he had 
learned about censorship in the mind. All of his work involved postal networks and 
gathering information through newspapers, that’s how he thought. He was really worried 
about actual censorship: can he send a letter to his son at the front, can he get a paper 
through to his collaborators? He used the practices of the censor in Vienna to articulate 
and modify his notion of psychic censorship—a mix of the most abstract and the most 
concrete.  
 
It interests me a lot when objects function both in their material form and in abstraction 
simultaneously, not through this long process of ascension from the factory floor to 
                                               
10 Peter Galison, Einstein’s Clocks, Poincaré’s Maps: Empires of Time (New York: 
W.W. Norton, 2003). 
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Plato’s heaven or vice versa, but in their co-mingling all along. I’m less interested in 
metaphors of ascent or descent, but instead in the sudden presence together of very 
abstract and very material things. 
 
DT Is a building, a work of architecture, always, as Peter just described it, suddenly and 
simultaneously making present the abstract and the physical? 
 
AP Oh yes, I think architecture is always about that. But more and more I’m interested in 
a physical, almost physically empathic dimension. You remember Panofsky and his very 
strange analogy between scholasticism and Gothic construction?11 I think we have all 
kinds of constructive metaphors like that in the head. Construction is related to the way 
we understand our own thought, and to the way we relate to the world through our body. 
 
DT In what way is it not a metaphor? 
 
AP Of course it’s always a metaphor.12 If you go behind the metaphor, though, you get to 
the fact that through objects we construct categories to read the world. When we produce 
objects, we also produce division—not metaphors, but ways to divide, analyze, and sort 
the world. An object for me is always a kind of proto-argument. The difference is that if 
it was an argument, you would not need an object. In architecture today form always 
needs to be related to an argument; but if it’s an argument, it’s not architecture.  
 
DT Is every object a hybrid object? 
 
AP For me there are two ways of understanding objects. One way is to place them in 
networks as Bruno Latour does, seeing the object as an actor. I’m more interested in other 
properties of the object. First, the object has a material epistemology. An epistemology, 
before being ethereal, is material, linked to the way we produce and understand objects. 
Second, an object is physical experience, a relation to the body. If you visit a cantilevered 
building, you feel some kind of anxiety, or pain, or exhilaration; you feel something 
almost in your bones. Yet nothing a priori will tell you how to divide it into parts. 
Nothing will tell you how to distinguish a ceiling from a wall. When we are in this room, 
we understand that there is a floor and a ceiling and so on, but there is nothing in the 
room itself that forces us as to distinguish them. The very fact that we conceive an object 
and recognize it as an object is linked to categories and experience. And it’s this that 
allows them to participate in a complex Galisonian argument where you can find clocks, 
maps, and special relativity. There is already something in the object that links to these 
epistemological questions.  
 
PG Different histories carve up the world and objects in different ways. Do you count a 
city as an object or not? Is an individual person an object? Or are collectivities objects? 
These are the foundational debates that have wracked every academic discipline for the 
                                               
11 Erwin Panofsky, Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism (Latrobe: The Archabbey 
Press, 1951). 
12 Antoine Picon and Alessandra Ponte, eds., Architecture and Science: Exchanging 
Metaphors (Princeton: Princeton Architectural Press, 2003). 
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last several hundred years. The existence of sociology, for instance, depends on the status 
of the collective. So it appears to me two different questions could be asked. One is, “can 
you have non-material objects that are worth calling objects?” And the other is, “are there 
multiple ways of parsing a given object, whether it is material or non-material?” which is 
what Antoine is pointing to today.  
 
AP And these are old problems. For the Romans, you had a question: when you fix 
something on the wall, is it part of the wall or is it independent? That was linked to the 
concept of ornament. For the Romans ornament was something fixed to the wall that you 
could still intellectually consider as distinct. A brick is not an ornament, but fixed marble 
on the wall is an ornament. So you see, where is the object? Today we have difficulty 
understanding what the Romans understood as ornament. 
 
DT So it’s an historical problem. 
 
AP It was a cultural problem, but also a legal problem. In Roman law, there is the strange 
case of an aristocratic family that was forbidden to sell wall ornaments, because the 
ornaments were considered part the family’s heritage. Romans saw ornament as 
something that “piled up.” Ornament was like wealth or money. Hence you had to 
constantly increase the quantity of ornament, of the family, of the empire, of the city. We 
have a qualitative vision of ornament and a relatively quantitative vision of the fabric. 
The Romans saw it in reverse. When we see Roman bathhouses we think that what is 
quantitative is the masonry and what is qualitative is the marble, but ornament is much 
more complicated. 
 
DT Part of the discussion in Speculative Realism has to do emergence. At what point do 
you have something that you call an object yet can still take away parts of it, so it’s not 
understood as an aggregate but as an entity? 
 
AP I think we live in a post-Deleuzean world. We see objects more as processes that 
unfold than as static entities. Emergence is linked to a certain philosophical dimension 
going from Deleuze up to today. So you have that line. Then you have a certain 
understanding of the physical world as described by science linked to a certain 
understanding by designers. And then there is something at stake in the discipline: what 
do designers really do? Do they shape forms like potters? Or are they people who manage 
dynamisms? Today’s designers wish to go beyond the potter, who finishes a building like 
you finish a piece of pottery. So “emergence” is also the name given to a professional 
claim for the social relevance of architecture. 
 
DT Is that true in science today? 
 
PG The example of ornament is a beautiful one. The way that entities enter into our 
world is very consequential. I agree with Antoine these are not categories determined 
once and for all. Take DNA. What is DNA? Well, we can say that what it really is, is the 
mechanism of genetic transmission of information. But then it turns out it’s also part of 
computation. So then what is it? Is it part of a computer? Which is more fundamental? 
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Once you build new scientific structures (to come back to the term Antoine was 
discussing before), it changes the status of individuation and categorical classification. 
 
Physicists worry about emergence, too. The question might be seen to be purely 
metaphysical, or it might be seen to be a question of directing our attention to certain 
phenomena, or it could be a political economic one in the sense of whether you support 
disciplines. For instance, there is the famous debate carried out between Philip Anderson 
and Steven Weinberg concerning whether condensed matter physics is as fundamental as 
particle physics. Is condensed matter physics just particle physics carried out on more 
complicated systems? Anderson would say that when you talk about heat or 
superconductivity or any other collective phenomenon, it’s not a property of an 
individual particle. Lasing is a collective phenomenon. It’s meaningless to say that a 
single electron is “lasing.”  
 
You could say the question is purely metaphysical, concerning where you think first 
things should be located. The particle physics question concerns foundation, the 
fundament of our universe. So for scientists it was an argument about metaphysics, but it 
was also an argument about a $15 billion superconducting supercollider which they 
wanted to build in Texas. 
 
DT With buildings are we again discussing objects at a different register from the 
ontological level of realism and anti-realism? What about physicality? 
 
AP The urgent question is, how do we rearticulate what we still do in the physical world? 
The virtual world creates as many material problems as it’s supposed to solve. Its space 
consuming, there are format obsolescence issues. A lot of things will probably not be 
digitized. Lots of old papers and so on. This electronic world needs a lot of physical 
spaces, energy, etc. Which might be its real limit. We may reach a point where 
information is just too expensive to store.  
 
PG Yes. We’ve talked about the abstractions inherent in the immediate physicality, but 
the opposite is true too. That is to say, the virtual is not bloodless, without physicality. All 
you have to do is look around at cyber bulling, and cyber security and cyber warfare. 
These are responses to having a presence in a virtual world. It is extremely consequential 
in the physical world how we’re playing things out in the virtual one. 
 
AP We’re not yet in a totally dematerialized world. To access this immaterial world, you 
need a big screen, and cables, and server farms that create heat: all of these have physical 
dimensions.   
 
PG And surveillance, privacy, identity. These are questions that are very pressing.  
 
AP The truth is the world is becoming more hybrid, but it’s not dematerializing. That’s a 
pure fiction. 
 
PG I agree with that completely.  
